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This paper presents a model of the choice between marriage and cohabitation for a couple who
have decided to form a relationship. The model is used to analyse the implications of changing from
a title based division of property on divorce to an equal sharing regime. There are two opposing
effects. In line with popular expectations, the change to an equal sharing regime prevents some
wealthy individuals from marrying since they risk losing half of their assets in the event of divorce.
Offsetting this, the equal sharing property division regime enables cooperative investments to be
made in marriage, and so increases the value of marriage relative to cohabitation for some couples.
Overall the impact on the marriage rate is ambiguous, although the rate is most likely to increase
where it is more difficult to make cooperative investments due to unilateral divorce laws, and where
couples are more similar to each other, reducing their cost of divorce.




It is widely documented that there have been sharp declines in marriage rates, and concurrent rises in
unmarried cohabitation rates in most Western countries (Bumpass, Sweet and Cherlin 1991, Kiernan
1999). In addition, there have been significant increases in divorce rates since 1960 (Friedberg 1998).
Whilst attitudes towards unmarried cohabitation have softened over time (Haskey 2001), there remain
concerns over the negative implications of the declining importance and stability of marriage (Morgan
2000, Waite and Gallagher 2000). Legal changes have proceeded in parallel to (and in some cases have
precipitated) these trends. These changes have often been driven by immediate fairness concerns – for
example addressing the documented financial disadvantage faced by women after divorce (see Duncan
and Hoffman (1985)) by making the property division regime more favourable to them. These legal
changes affect the choices individuals make regarding partnership formation and dissolution, as well as
fertility, labour supply and other outcomes (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007). If a policymaker wishes to
use the legal environment to support the institution of marriage it is important to consider these wider
implications. This paper shows how changes to laws governing the division of property on partnership
dissolution can affect a couple’s incentives to make cooperative investments and so their decision to
marry or cohabit.
I present a model of a couple’s choice to marry or cohabit, to make a cooperative investment, and
to dissolve their relationship, for a couple who have decided to form a partnership. Once their chosen
relationship is formed, the couple have the opportunity to make a relationship-specific investment which
will increase their combined payoffs. A random shock to their relationship quality may then cause the
relationship to breakdown, awarding the couple their separation payoffs. The separation payoffs are
determined by the property division regime in effect for their relationship. I distinguish between equal
sharing property division where the couple split equally the combined payoff accrued up to that point,
and title based property division where individuals receive what they have directly contributed. If the
couple remains together, they share the total product of their relationship equally.
I use this model to evaluate the impact of a change from a title based to equal sharing property
division regime for marriage. The shift to an equal sharing regime is popularly expected to lead to fewer
marriages as individuals with significant assets are unwilling to risk their loss in the event of divorce
(Miles and Harris-Short 2009). Whilst the model captures this mechanism, it also suggests an opposing
effect. The equal sharing regime shares the costs and benefits of all cooperative investments and so
enables all efficient investments to be made within marriage. So the legal change makes marriage more
valuable relative to cohabitation for couples who could not cooperate in a title based regime. I argue that
in increasing the value of marriage this legal change reinforces its importance. More couples experience
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this increase in the value of marriage in a unilateral divorce regime than in a consent divorce regime.
Indeed, in a unilateral divorce regime the model predicts an unambiguous increase in the amount of
cooperative investments made. The higher value of marriage increases the marriage rate, so overall there
is no clear prediction of the impact of a change from title based to equal sharing property division on
the marriage rate.
Turning to divorce rates, the impact of a move from title based to equal sharing property division can
be decomposed into two effects.1 Firstly, there is an incentive effect for couples who are already married.
There is a transfer from the wealthier partner to their spouse in the event of a divorce. Under a consent
divorce regime, both partners must agree to a divorce. This means that the less wealthy partner makes
the divorce decision, and since their divorce payoff is increased by the change to a title based regime,
the incentive effect works to increase the divorce rate. Under a unilateral regime the wealthier partner
makes the divorce decision and so the incentive effect makes divorce less likely.
Second, there is a long term selection effect on divorce rates which depends upon the characteristics
of those getting married under the new regime. Since the model gives no clear prediction of the change
in numbers of couples marrying and their characteristics, the long run impact of the regime change on
the divorce rate is ambiguous.
The paper contributes to the growing literature concerning the impact of legal regimes governing
divorce on divorce rates and other outcomes.
The early literature focused on the impact of a change from consent to unilateral divorce laws. Peters
(1986) considered the impact of the change on divorce rates, divorce settlement amounts, remarriage
rates and labour supply. There has been further research into the impact on divorce rates, for example
Friedberg (1998) and Wolfers (2006) for the US, and Gonza`lez and Viitanen (2009) and Smith (1997) for
Europe – it is generally accepted that the change to unilateral divorce led to at least a transitory increae in
divorce rates. The impact of unilateral divorce on female labour supply is investigated by Gray (1998),
Stevenson (2008)2 and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), whilst fertility is considered by Alesina
and Giuliano (2006). Further outcomes investigated are age at first marriage (Allen 2002), outcomes for
children raised under a unilateral divorce regime (Gruber 2004) and the incidence of domestic violence
(Stevenson and Wolfers 2006). Wickelgren (2007) provides a theoretical explanation for changes in
relationship-specific investments, whilst Stevenson (2007) investigates this outcome empirically (also
controlling for the property division regime). The impact of the change on the decision to marry (relative
to remaining single) is theoretically explored by Rasul (2006). Matouschek and Rasul (2008) present
models of the choice between marriage and cohabitation given that a couple has decided to form a
1This follows Matouschek and Rasul’s (2008) decomposition of the effects of a change from consent to unilateral divorce
law.
2Gray (1998) and Stevenson (2008) control for divorce property division regime.
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partnership, and investigate their implications empirically using US data.
More recently attention has been given to the effects of different marital property division regimes.
To date, research has largely focused on the impact of these regimes on the divorce rate (Mechoulan
2006, Smith 2007, Marcassa 2008, Langlais 2009). Clark (1999), Fella, Manzini and Mariotti (2004) and
Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2007) illustrate that property division laws can affect the divorce rate even
in the absence of bargaining transaction costs. There has also been some work relating property division
regimes to labour supply (Kapan 2008) and the demand for prenuptial contracts (Rainer 2007).3
There has been little work on the effect of marital property regimes on the decision to marry or to
cohabit. A partial exception is Dnes (2002), which discusses the impact of different property regimes
on cohabitation and marriage, but does not provide a formal model. This paper fills this gap in the
literature.
I use the model to assess the implications of recent legal developments in England and Wales. The
2001 the House of Lords ruling inWhite v White4 introduced a yardstick of equal division of physical and
financial assets on divorce, a significant change from the previous default of limiting a wife to her reason-
able requirements. The 2006 Miller v Miller, McFarlane v McFarlane5 ruling has a similar implication
for human capital. My model suggests that these changes should have wider consequences of discourag-
ing marriages between individuals with large differences in assets and human capital, but encouraging
marriages where there are gains to be made from cooperative investments, including specialisation.
Although this paper focuses on England and Wales, the analysis can be applied to other jurisdictions
and legal changes. For example, a further relationship type could be introduced to model the introduction
of covenant marriages which are being considered in several US states.6 Alternatively the cohabitation
property division regime could be varied. Several jurisdictions are currently contemplating such changes
(for example England andWales (The Law Commission 2007), the United States (American Law Institute
2002) and Ireland (Law Reform Commission 2006)).
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the model and section 3 describes its solution.
Section 4 summarises the results and implications of the model, with the key results in section 4.2.
Section 5 discusses the recent legal developments in England and Wales in the context of the model, and
section 6 concludes.
3There has also been some work on the impact of variation in child support and child custody laws on marriage and
divorce rates (Marcassa 2008, Barham, Devlin and Yang 2006, Halla 2008).
4[2001] AC 596.
5[2006] UKHL 24.
6In a covenant marriage a couple has limited grounds for divorce and must undergo premarital counselling. Louisiana,
Arkansas and Arizona currently offer covenant marriages.
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2 A model of household formation and separation with one-
sided cooperative investment
I present a tractable model which captures the choice between marriage and cohabitation, the decision
of one partner to make a cooperative investment, and the subsequent choice to separate or divorce.
I interpret marriage as a contract which imposes two sets of conditions on its dissolution. Firstly,
the contract determines the split of marital assets in the event of divorce – either assets are given
to the spouse who contributed them (title based property division) or assets are shared equally (equal
sharing property division). Second, the contract determines whether both parties must agree to a divorce
occurring (consent divorce) or alternatively either partner can simply leave the marriage (unilateral
divorce). Figure 1 shows the four possible legal regimes which can apply for marriage.









The two dimensions of legal variation combine to give four distinct legal environments
for marriage. Cohabitation is governed by titled based property division and unilateral
divorce – T,U .
Traditionally the marriage regime in England and Wales was consent divorce and title based property
division. As in many other Western countries the divorce regime shifted towards unilateral divorce in
the 1960s. More recently the property division regime has more closely resembled equal sharing. This
development is discussed further in section 5.
In contrast, cohabiting couples are not subject to the marriage contract and so either partner can
leave the relationship without the other’s consent. I assume that title based property division prevails
for cohabitants.7 So, cohabitation is governed by unilateral separation and title based property division
– the top right box in figure 1.
Matouschek and Rasul (2008) identify three key mechanisms to explain why couples might choose
7This is a reasonable approximation of the legal position in England and Wales. Other jurisdictions apply a range of
different property division regimes to cohabitants.
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marriage over cohabitation – an exogenous benefit, derived from conforming to society’s expectations,
marriage as a commitment device fostering cooperation, and marriage as a signalling device for pri-






















The timeline for the model is illustrated in figure 2. Parties’ payoffs are their shares of the accumulated
household asset9 consumed at the end of the game.
There are two actors – individuals m (the man) and f (the woman)10 – who are able to contribute
xm and xf respectively to the household asset. I assume that xm > xf , so it is always the partner less
able to contribute who has the opportunity to make a cooperative investment. At time 1, each individual
chooses whether they wish to marry or cohabit. Marriage occurs when both partners choose to marry.
At time 2, the woman chooses whether to make a cooperative investment in the household asset. If she
makes the investment, she reduces her contribution for that period to xf − c and increases her partner’s
contribution to xm+ b. The total household asset contribution prior to Nature’s move is xm+xf + b− c.
Accumulation of the household asset is assumed to be independent of utility flows through the period.
It can be thought of in two ways – first as a physical asset such as a shared residence. In this case the
investment reflects the woman’s income being used for day-to-day bills and purchases allowing the man
to purchase the property and so be its legal owner. Second, the household asset could be human capital.
Then the investment reflects the woman specialising in home production and supporting her partner so
increasing his market productivity. This distinction is discussed further in section 5.
At time 3, Nature acts, choosing an additional contribution to the household asset, s, which is drawn
from a uniform distribution on [−γ, γ]. This gain can be interpreted as a measure of the couple’s match
8Adding an exogenous benefit to marriage is straightforward but is not pursued in this paper.
9This is similar in spirit to Rainer’s (2007) family asset.
10This is for expositional clarity and not intended to be a reflection of reality.
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quality, which allows economies of scale to be achieved and so frees up resources for investment in the
household asset. The couple observe this gain, and then choose whether to separate or remain together
at time 4. The outcome of this stage depends upon the relationship type (separation from cohabitation
happens if either partner chooses it) and the prevailing divorce regime (under consent divorce, both
partners must wish to divorce for divorce to occur).
In the event of separation or divorce, the household asset is split according to the relevant property
division regime, giving each partner their own individual household asset. Individuals then contribute
to their own household asset (adding xm or xf ), giving their final payoff.
If the couple remain together, they add to their joint household asset according to their ability (adding
xm+xf ), and their realised value of s. Their total joint household asset is assumed to be equally owned,
so each partner’s payoff is 50% of the total.
2.1 Key assumptions
I make several simplifying assumptions in order to gain a clear view of the impact of different property
regimes on relationship choice and dissolution decisions. I focus on investments in a household asset, with
payoffs being linked only to the amount of this asset accumulated. I therefore assume that individuals’
ability to make these investments is independent of their instantaneous utility flow during the game.
I assume that prenuptial contracts are not available. This means that couples face a choice between
marriage and its accompanying legal regime, or cohabitation. I justify this assumption on two grounds.
Firstly, in some jurisdictions these contracts are not enforceable. This is currently the case in England
and Wales. Second, even in jurisdictions where prenuptial contracts are enforceable there are usually
requirements relating to independent legal advice and full disclosure which must be fulfilled (Scherpe
2007). This means that such contracts are expensive to write and limited in their scope. In addition,
the cooperative investment is noncontractible as it is not verifiable by third parties. For example, if the
woman reduced market work in order to support her partner, an outside party would be unable to verify
if that support was being provided, or instead that the woman had taken the spare time as leisure, with
any increase in the partner’s human capital being down to his own efforts. This means that the woman
cannot induce marriage by guaranteeing that she will invest.
I assume that transaction costs and borrowing constraints prevent Becker-Coasean bargains being
made. This means that marriage and divorce cannot be induced or prevented with transfers. If the
Becker-Coase theorem holds, then changes in divorce regimes should have no impact upon outcomes
since only efficient divorces should occur when utility is transferable.11 However, there is anecdotal
11The failure of the Becker-Coase theorem does not necessarily imply inefficient outcomes (Clark 1999), (Chiappori et
al. 2007), (Fella et al. 2004). Permitting its failure whilst retaining efficiency of outcomes would require non-transferability
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evidence that the costs involved in contracting over personal relationships are very high. For example
family lawyers in Australia reported that few couples enquiring about prenuptial contracts eventually
signed them (Fehlberg and Smyth 2002).
The model applies to couples who have already matched and decided to form a household together
– individuals do not have the option of remaining single. There is considerable heterogeneity in types
of cohabiting couples. For example, cohabitation as a trial marriage (“nubile” cohabitation) suggests
cohabitation as an alternative to being single (Murhpy 2000). However, cohabitation durations are
growing (Ermisch and Francesconi 2000) (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007). This model best describes the
partnership decision of a couple who have possibly undergone a period of nubile cohabitation and are
subsequently deciding whether to marry.
I do not model the equilibrium of the marriage market. This means that whilst I can evaluate a
given couple’s choice, I do not know what the distribution of parameter combinations in a population
of partnering couples would be. In addition there is no market for repartnering. This implies that the
woman never wishes to separate since there is no chance of finding a better match. Repartnering is in
fact widespread. In England and Wales, 43% of divorcing women and 51% of divorcing men repartner
within 5 years. However, the probability of repartnering falls dramatically with age, falling by around
3% for each year older a woman is, and also if a woman has children (Fisher and Low 2009). My analysis
is therefore most relevant for older couples and those with children. These are the couples for whom the
trade off between the benefits of cooperative investment and the potential cost of divorce is greatest.
3 Model solution
The model is solved using backward induction. I first consider the decision to separate or remain together
given the outcome of Nature’s move at time 3. This determines separation probabilities. Then the
woman’s decision to make the cooperative investment is studied, before expected payoffs from marriage
and cohabitation are compared to ascertain the relationship choice made.
I proceed by calculating expected payoffs in the four possible legal regimes governing marriage.
3.1 Separation probabilities
When a couple chooses whether to remain together or to separate, they have full knowledge of their
future payoffs (s has been revealed), and so choose to remain together or separate optimally. The payoffs
vary depending on whether the woman has made the cooperative investment.
of utility in either marriage or after divorce.
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Ri,I denotes the payoff from remaining together and SPi,I denotes the payoff from separating, where
i ∈ {m, f}, I ∈ {0, 1} (equal to one when the investment has been made) and P ∈ {E, T} (property
division regime – E denotes equal sharing, T denotes title based).
First consider couples where the woman has made the cooperative investment. All couples who
remain together split their retirement savings equally, so have identical payoffs given by Ri,1, regardless
of the prevailing separation regime.
Ri,1 = xm + xf +
1
2
(b− c+ s), i ∈ {m, f}
Payoffs in the case of separation vary between the man and the woman, and also depend upon the
property division regime. In the case of a title based regime (and so also within cohabitation), separation
payoffs are STi,1:
STm,1 = 2xm + b
STf,1 = 2xf − c







xf + xi +
1
2
(b− c), i ∈ {m, f}
Where the woman has not made the cooperative investment, payoffs are as above, but with b and c
set to zero, that is:
Ri,0 = xm + xf + 12s, i ∈ {m, f}





2xf + xi, i ∈ {m, f}
For individuals to find it optimal to remain together, they must have Ri,I > SPi,I . This requires that
the realised value of s is sufficiently high. Table 1 shows the individuals’ threshold values of s in the two
property regimes when the investment is undertaken. The values when investment is not undertaken
can be found by setting b and c equal to zero. I denote X = xm − xf for notational convenience, where
X > 0 by assumption.
In a title based regime b and c enter the expression with the same sign. This is because in a title based
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Table 1: Values of s for which couples wish to stay together, I = 1
Title based Equal sharing
m s > 2X + (b+ c) s > X
f s > −2X − (b+ c) s > −X
regime the gain for the man (and loss for the woman) from separating relative to remaining together is
1
2 (b+ c). If separation occurs the man does not share the benefit b and does not shoulder any of the cost
c. In contrast the costs and benefits of investment are shared equally under equal sharing, and so b and
c do not enter the expressions.
In a unilateral divorce regime, only one of the relevant thresholds for s need fail for separation to
occur, whereas in a consent divorce regime both must fail. Since X > 0 we see that the man’s inequality
always holds when the woman’s does. So, in a unilateral divorce regime, the man determines whether or
not separation occurs, whereas in a consent regime the woman does. Given knowledge of the distribution
of s (uniform on [−γ, γ]), separation probabilities in the four regimes can be found – these are shown
in table 2 for the situation where the investment has been made (again, set b and c to zero for the no
investment case).12
Table 2: Separation/Divorce probabilities, I = 1
Unilateral Consent
Title based 12γ (γ + 2X + (b+ c))
1
2γ (γ − 2X − (b+ c))
Equal sharing 12γ (γ +X)
1
2γ (γ −X)
For given parameter values there is a clear descending ranking of divorce probabilities: title based
and unilateral; equal sharing and unilateral; equal sharing and consent; title based and consent. In a
unilateral divorce and title based property division regime the man can retain all of his wealth and the
additional benefit of any investment made without incurring the associated costs on separation. Under
a unilateral and equal sharing regime, the man cannot opportunistically appropriate the benefits of any
cooperative investment, and faces a lower payoff in the event of separation ( 12 (xm − xf ) less). He is
therefore less likely to initiate a divorce under the equal sharing regime. In a consent and equal sharing
regime, the woman makes the divorce decision and she prefers to stay married and add 12 (xm + xf ) to
her payoff rather than just xf (unless s is very low). Under a consent and title based regime the woman
stands to lose even more from divorce relative to remaining married – she extracts only her own xf and
loses any claim on b whilst incurring cost c. So the title based regime discourages her from initiating
divorce.
12I proceed by assuming that γ is sufficiently high so that all probabilities in table 2 are between 0 and 1. My results
and conclusions are robust to relaxing this assumption.
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In a unilateral divorce regime separation probabilities are increasing in X. Here the man determines
separation. As xm increases separation becomes more attractive; as xf increases remaining together
becomes more attractive. In contrast in a consent regime probabilities are decreasing in X, since the
woman’s divorce payoffs are increasing in xf whereas her payoffs from remaining together are increasing
in xm. Separation probabilities in an equal sharing regime are identical regardless of whether the woman
has made the investment as any costs and benefits are split equally, so the investment does not create an
incentive for the man to opportunistically leave the marriage. In a title based property regime, making
the investment makes divorce less likely in a consent divorce environment since the woman would lose
1
2 (b + c) in the case of divorce. However, with unilateral divorce the investment increases separation
probabilities due to the man’s ability to extract all of the benefit of the investment at no cost to himself.
3.2 Investment decision
I next consider the woman’s choice to make the cooperative investment. The probabilities in table 2 can
be used to calculate the expected value of s given that the couple stays together (s exceeds the relevant
threshold, Y ) – this is γ multiplied by the divorce probability:
E[t|t > Y ] = 1
2
(γ + Y )
= γPr(t < Y )
This conditional expectation of s and the relevant probability can be used to find the woman’s
expected payoffs in the different regimes if the relationship continues, or ends. So, if pP,DI is the relevant
separation probability, with D ∈ {U,C} representing the divorce regime (unilateral, U, or consent, C),
expected payoffs for continuing relationships will be:




E[Ri,0|P,D] = xm + xf + 12γp
P,D
0
Denoting the expected payoff from a given relationship as E[Qi|I, P,D], expected payoffs can be
found by evaluating equation 1 at the relevant expected payoffs and probabilities (separation payoffs are
not a function of s and so are deterministic).
E[Qi|I, P,D] = (1− pP,DI )E[Ri,I ] + pP,DI E[SPi,I ] (1)
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Table 3: f ’s expected payoffs
Regime I = 1 I = 0
T,U Zf − 3X22γ − 32γ (b+ c)X − 38γ (b+ c)2 + 14 (b− 3c) Zf − 3X
2
2γ




2γ (b+ c)X +
1
8γ (b+ c)
2 + 14 (b− 3c) Zf + X
2
2γ




2 (b− c) Zf + X4 − 3X
2
8γ
















Substituting for the relevant probabilities results in the expected payoffs for the woman shown in
table 3. Her expected payoffs are higher under consent divorce than under unilateral divorce due to her
controlling the divorce decision in a consent regime. Her expected payoffs are higher with equal sharing
than with title based property division as equal sharing gives her a claim on xm.
The decision to invest is made by comparing E[Qf |1, P,D] with E[Qf |0, P,D], that is based on which
payoff in table 3 is higher.
By inspection, under an equal sharing property division regime, the woman will always find it optimal
to make the investment. This is because she gains 12 (b − c) from doing so in all outcomes, sharing the
cost and benefits of the investment. For example, she would be happy to work part time, reducing her
human capital, to support her husband in increasing his human capital, since she would receive half of
the value of his enhanced human capital in the event of divorce.
However, under a title based property division regime, she will not always make the investment, as she
is not guaranteed to reap the benefits and risks bearing the costs. The condition required for investment
is different in consent and unilateral divorce regimes. In a unilateral divorce regime, the woman invests






(b− c) = X¯T,U (2)
As X increases, the man’s incentive to unilaterally end the marriage increases (as explained above),
and so the woman is less willing to make the investment. An increase in c reduces the attractiveness
of investment since both its cost and the separation probability increase. The impact of an increase
in b is ambiguous since it increases the benefit of the investment whilst simultaneously increasing the
probability of separation.
In a consent divorce regime, the woman invests if condition 3 holds.
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(b− c) = X¯T,C (3)
As X increases, the probability of separation falls, and so the woman is more willing to invest.
Increasing b unambiguously increases the attraction of making the investment as its return increases and
the probability of separation falls. An increase in c has an ambiguous effect as it reduces the separation
probability and also reduces the return on investment.
I have made the restriction thatX > 0 and so constraints 2 and 3 will only be relevant when X¯T,U > 0
and X¯T,C > 0 respectively. If X¯T,U < 0 then investment never occurs in a title based, unilateral regime,
and if X¯T,C < 0 then investment always occurs in a title based, consent regime. As X¯T,U < −X¯T,C ,
only one of conditions 2 and 3 is relevant at any one time. This means that if 2 holds, 3 must also hold
(but not vice versa). So, there is always a larger range of X at which investment takes place under a title
based, consent regime than under a title based, unilateral regime – and by implication, there is always
more cooperative investment in marriage than in cohabitation.
This analysis shows that an equal sharing regime solves the investment hold-up problem within
marriage – all efficient investments can be made. In a title based, consent divorce regime the net benefit
of investment must be sufficiently high for the investment to be made since the woman loses out in the
event of separation. Fewest couples invest in a title based, unilateral regime.
3.3 Relationship choice
Individuals make their choice between marriage in the prevailing legal regime and cohabitation by com-
paring the expected payoffs from each in the knowledge of whether the cooperative investment will be
made in either relationship state. The woman’s expected payoffs are shown in table 3 above. Analogously,
the man’s expected payoffs can be found. These are shown in table 4. The man’s expected payoffs are
higher under unilateral divorce than consent divorce, and under title based than equal sharing property
division.
In this model, the expected payoff from cohabitation is identical to the expected payoff from marriage
under a title based, unilateral regime, therefore couples are indifferent between cohabitation and marriage
in a title based, unilateral regime. There are multiple equilibria where the man and woman each choose
either marriage or cohabitation.
In all other regimes the woman will always prefer marriage to cohabitation. This is because she always
experiences a higher payoff when she remains in a relationship instead of separating, and marriage leads
to a lower separation probability and so a higher chance of achieving this outcome. This is because there
is no remarriage market, as discussed in section 2.1. It is therefore the man’s decision which determines
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Table 4: m’s expected payoffs
Regime I = 1 I = 0




2γ (b+ c)X +
1
8γ (b+ c)
2 + 14 (3b− c) Zm + X
2
2γ
T,C Zm − 3X22γ − 32γ (b+ c)X − 38γ (b+ c)2 + 14 (3b− c) Zm − 3X
2
2γ




2 (b− c) Zm − X4 + X
2
8γ
















when a marriage takes place.
If condition 2 holds, then the cooperative investment will be made in cohabitation and also in all
forms of marriage (condition 3 must also hold). In this case, the man will never want to marry. This is
because entering into a marriage constrains his future action and brings no benefit. In an equal sharing,
unilateral regime, he risks losing 12X in the event of divorce; in a title based, consent regime he opens
up the possibility of being trapped in a marriage when the realised s is not sufficiently high for him to
wish to remain in it; and both of these effects combine in an equal sharing, consent regime.
If condition 2 does not hold, then the cooperative investment is never made in cohabitation. This
means that there is always a gain made by marrying under an equal sharing regime (where the man
always makes the investment) – if this gain is sufficiently large to offset the constraint on his future
action, the man will wish to marry and so marriage will occur. The conditions under which marriage
occurs under unilateral and consent divorce are given in inequalities 4 and 5 respectively.
3X2 + 2γX − 4γ(b− c) < 0 (4)
7X2 + 2γX − 4γ(b− c) < 0 (5)
In both regimes, marriage becomes less likely as X increases, since the man’s loss in the event of
divorce ( 12X) increases. As b − c increases, the payoff from marriage increases and so more marriages
occur. Marriage is less likely under consent divorce than unilateral divorce as the man additionally risks
being in an unsatisfactory marriage that he cannot dissolve.
If condition 2 does not hold, but condition 3 does, then we have investment in marriage under a title
based, consent regime but not in cohabitation. So, marriage will take place if condition 6 holds.
14
16X2 + 12X(b+ c) + 3(b+ c)2 − 2γ(3b− c) < 0 (6)
Again, marriage is less likely as X increases and as b− c falls.
If neither of conditions 2 or 3 holds, then investment does not take place in cohabitation or any title
based property division marriage regime. So, under any title based property division marriage regime,
the man will never wish to marry since there is no compensation for the additional restrictions on future
behaviour.
So marriage occurs where it enables a cooperative investment which compensates the man for the risk
to his contributions in the case of divorce. The equilibria are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Equilibria exist in the different legal regimes as follows:
A. Title based property division, unilateral divorce
(i) f chooses to marry or to cohabit;
(ii) m chooses to marry or to cohabit;
(iii) f chooses I = 1 if X < X¯TU , and I = 0 otherwise;
(iv) m chooses to separate if t < 2X + (b+ c), and to stay together otherwise; and
(v) f chooses to separate if t < −2X − (b+ c), and to stay together otherwise.
B. Title based property division, consent divorce
(i) f chooses to marry;
(ii) m chooses to marry if X > X¯TU , X > X¯TC and 16X2+12X(b+c)+3(b+c)2−2γ(3b−c) < 0,
and to cohabit otherwise;
(iii) f chooses I = 1 if m chooses to marry and X > X¯TC or if m chooses to cohabit and
X < X¯TU , and I = 0 otherwise;
(iv) m chooses to separate if t < 2X + (b+ c), and to stay together otherwise; and
(v) f chooses to separate if t < −2X − (b+ c), and to stay together otherwise.
C. Equal sharing property division, unilateral divorce
(i) f chooses to marry;
(ii) m chooses to marry if X > X¯TU and 3X2 + 2γX − 4γ(b− c) < 0, and to cohabit otherwise;
(iii) f chooses I = 1 if m chooses to marry or if m chooses to cohabit and X < X¯TU , and I = 0
otherwise;
(iv) m chooses to separate if m chooses marry and t < X or if m chooses cohabit and t <
2X + (b+ c), and to stay together otherwise;
(v) f chooses to separate if m chooses marry and t < −X or if m chooses cohabit and t <
−2X − (b+ c), and to stay together otherwise.
D. Equal sharing property division, consent divorce
(i) f chooses to marry;
(ii) m chooses to marry if X > X¯TU and 7X2 + 2γX − 4γ(b− c) < 0, and to cohabit otherwise;
(iii) f chooses I = 1 if m chooses to marry or if m chooses to cohabit and X < X¯TU , and I = 0
otherwise;
15
(iv) m chooses to separate if m chooses marry and t < X or if m chooses cohabit and t <
2X + (b+ c), and to stay together otherwise; and
(v) f chooses to separate if m chooses marry and t < −X or if m chooses cohabit and t <
−2X − (b+ c), and to stay together otherwise.
4 Model results and implications
I now consider the impact of changing the legal regime on the decision to divorce, to make a cooperative
investment in the household asset, and to marry. I first briefly consider the impact of a change from
consent to unilateral divorce before focusing on a change from a title based to an equal sharing property
regime – the key results for the paper are given in section 4.2.
I follow Matouschek and Rasul (2008) in distinguishing between two effects of a change in regime on
the decision to divorce – an incentive effect on the choices made by those married under the previous
regime, and a selection effect on the characteristics and so choices of the new population choosing to
marry. Considering the incentive effect is reasonable if the legal change is unexpected.
4.1 Consent to unilateral divorce
The impact of a change from consent to unilateral divorce on various outcomes has been investigated at
length. I therefore briefly present the implications of my model to show its consistency with previous
work.
4.1.1 Equal sharing property division
Under an equal sharing property division regime, a change from consent to unilateral divorce leads to an
increase in the marriage rate, since the man no longer faces the prospect of being trapped in a marriage
he wishes to exit, and so is more willing to marry to gain the benefits of a cooperative investment. The
increase in couples marrying increases the amount of cooperative investment overall.
The incentive effect is to increase the divorce rate for couples already married since the man can now
unilaterally exit marriage, and the selection effect reinforces this since the average X of newly married
couples is higher.
4.1.2 Title based property regime
Under a title based property regime, a change to unilateral divorce leads to fewer marriages, as the
ability to sustain cooperation within marriage but not in cohabitation disappears. Some couples will
marry since both partners are indifferent between relationship types. However, none of these couples
will make the cooperative investment. There will therefore be less cooperative investment.
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The divorce rate increases for those already married, but the selection effect is uncertain (it depends
upon the average X of those now choosing to marry relative to previously). So the overall effect on the
divorce rate is ambiguous.
The implications under a title based property division regime are consistent with the conclusions of
Matouschek and Rasul (2008).
4.2 Title based to equal sharing property division
There is no existing analysis of the impact of the change from title based to equal sharing property
regimes on marriage rates, and limited comment on its impact on cooperative investment or divorce
rates. This paper explicitly considers these impacts holding the divorce regime (consent or unilateral)
constant.
4.2.1 Consent divorce
I first consider the impact on marriage rates. Figure 3 shows a series of diagrams indicating the range
of X at which couples choose to marry in title based and equal sharing property division regimes. The
horizontal axis shows the values of X, whilst the vertical axis allows the cost of the investment, c to
vary. Each graph is drawn for a different value of the benefit of the investment, b. At combinations of
X, c and b below the solid lines, couples are able to make the cooperative investment in cohabitation,
and so none marry. The area below the dotted line gives combinations of variables at which couples
marry under an equal sharing property division regime (ie. couples marry if they are below the dotted
line but above the solid line). The dotted line is downward sloping – as X increases, the net benefit of
cooperating must be higher (and so its cost lower) to offset the man’s lower payoff in the case of divorce
for marriage to occur. The dashed line encloses the region in which couples marry under a title based
regime – the upward sloping part of this line reflects that as X increases the divorce risk falls (since the
woman makes the divorce decision) and so the woman is more likely to make the cooperative investment.
To the right of the downward sloping section of the line, the gain to marriage is not sufficiently large to
compensate the man for his loss of flexibility.
The diagrams show that whilst there are some couples who no longer marry in an equal sharing
regime because of the risk to the wealthier partner’s assets, there are also parameter combinations at
which couples switch from cohabitation to marriage. This is because all efficient investments can be
made within marriage and so its value has increased for some couples who previously could not invest.
The effect on the aggregate marriage rate is therefore ambiguous, but couples with larger gains from
cooperative investments are now more likely to marry.
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Diagrams show parameter values (X, b, c) at which couples marry under different
property division regimes. All couples with parameter combinations below the solid
line can make the cooperative investment in cohabitation, so these couples do not
marry. Those couples with parameter combinations below the dashed line and above
the solid line will marry in a title based property regime. Couples with parameter
combinations below the dotted line and above the solid line will marry in an equal
sharing property division regime.
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For those who are already married, there is an increase in the probability of divorce when we move
to an equal sharing regime. This is because the woman has an incentive to opportunistically divorce
her partner since she would no longer lose the benefit of her investment and shoulder the full cost of it.
This incentive effect suggests an increase in the divorce rate. However, since there is also the ambiguous
change in the composition of those entering into marriage, the average divorce probability of the new
married population is uncertain. Hence the selection effect is ambiguous. So, after this change, under a
consent regime the divorce rate is expected to initially increase, and in the long run could be higher or
lower.
4.2.2 Unilateral divorce
Since there are multiple equilibria when marriage is governed by a unilateral, title based property division
regime (as explained in section 3.3), some couples do choose marriage under the title based property
division regime. I assume that the equilibrium a couple chooses is unrelated to their parameter values.
Married couples will only make the cooperative investment if they would also have done when cohabiting.
Figure 4 shows which couples marry under an equal sharing regime, where couples with parameter values
below the dashed line but above the solid line choose to marry. There is no equivalent line showing who
marries under a title based regime as then choosing marriage is unrelated to parameters.
As in a consent divorce regime, some couples (who would have randomly chosen marriage previously)
no longer marry due to the new risk for the man’s assets in the event of divorce. However, there is an
unambiguous increase in the range of parameter values at which the cooperative investment can be made
within marriage. This creates a benefit to marriage and so counteracts the reduction in the marriage
rate.
Existing married couples would be less likely to divorce. This is because the man now has a lower
divorce payoff. The change in the marriage rate and so the parameter distribution of the newly married
population is ambiguous and so the selection effect on the divorce rate is uncertain. Similarly, the
selection effect on the separation rate of cohabitants would be ambiguous.
Under unilateral divorce, the change from title based to equal sharing property division will have an
ambiguous effect on marriage and divorce choices, but an unambiguous increase in the amount of coop-
erative investment undertaken. Equal sharing increases the value of marriage by enabling cooperative
investments – couples with larger potential gains from cooperating become more likely to marry.
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Diagrams show parameter values (X, b, c) at which couples marry under an equal
sharing property division regime. All couples with parameter combinations below the
solid line can make the cooperative investment in cohabitation, so these couples do
not marry. Those couples with parameter combinations below the dashed line and
above the solid line will marry in an equal sharing property regime.
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5 Application to recent legal developments in England andWales
The legal regime governing property division on divorce in England and Wales has been affected by a
series of recent court rulings.13 These changes can be considered in the context of the model.
I first determine which version of the model to apply. In England and Wales, unilateral divorce is
possible, but only after a five year separation period. Whether this qualifies as true unilateral divorce is
a moot point. Many studies of the impact of a change from consent to unilateral divorce do not consider
unilateral divorce with a substantial separation period to be truly unilateral (for example Peters (1986)).
Later work suggests that results are robust to the classification of such jurisdictions as either consent or
unilateral. The structure of my model suggests that I should assume a unilateral divorce regime. This
is because my benefit to partnership drawn by Nature (s) is based upon an idea of match quality and
economies of scale. It should be possible for one partner to unilaterally destroy this benefit by living
independently, which would induce divorce.
The property division regime applying to unmarried cohabitants should also be clarified. Stack
v Dowden14 is a recent contribution to the case law. Here, the beneficial ownership of a house legally
owned in joint names was disputed. Miss Stack had a more successful career and so claimed to have made
a higher financial contribution. The House of Lords awarded Miss Stack a 65% share of the property.
Her superior financial contributions were deemed a valid reason to depart from the implications of the
legal title (Probert 2007). This implies that cohabitation should be viewed as a relationship in which
there is title based property division – even if a physical asset is conveyed into joint names, differing
financial contributions may affect beneficial ownership.
Prior to 2001, property settlements on divorce provided a claiming spouse with their ‘reasonable
requirements’. Such arrangements generally left the claimant with a small proportion of the total assets
(Probert 2006, 8-027). White v White15 introduced equal division as a yardstick for divorce settlements.
Mr and Mrs White worked in partnership as farmers throughout their long marriage, amassing assets
of £4.6m. On appeal, Mrs White was awarded a lump sum of £1.5m. In upholding this appeal the
House of Lords stated that there should be no discrimination between spouses and no bias against a
homemaker in divorce settlements (Probert 2007). This yardstick of equal division has been reinforced as
an appropriate starting point in Charman v Charman,16 subject to adjustments for ‘stellar contributions’
(Miles 2008).
So, there has been a significant change to the basis of property division on divorce. This covers
physical and financial assets. The model predicts that the legal change should affect incentives to marry,
13See Miles and Harris-Short (2009) for a detailed description of these changes and their consequences.
14[2007] UKHL 17
15[2001] 1 AC 596.
16[2007] EWCA Civ 503.
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divorce and make cooperative investments in a relationship. Under a unilateral divorce regime the central
prediction is that it becomes easier to make relationship-specific cooperative investments in marriage.
This increases the value of marriage. Any increase in marriage will be offset since couples with a large
difference in endowments and little to gain from cooperative investments in physical and financial assets
will not marry.
Couples who are already married should be less likely to divorce according to this model as the man’s
divorce payoff has fallen. This is in contrast with the common perception of England as the ‘divorce
capital of the world’ (Welstead 2008). My prediction is partly driven by the absence of remarriage
opportunities, which combined with a unilateral divorce regime means that the man makes the divorce
decision.
The long-run consequences for the divorce rate are uncertain in the model since it is not clear how
the characteristics of the new married population will differ from those of the old married population.
Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane17 had further implications for property division on divorce.
The Miller ruling established limits to the application of equal sharing of assets in short marriages
with vast premarital assets. McFarlane, which I focus on, introduced the basis of compensation for
disadvantageous decisions taken within marriage.
Mr and Mrs McFarlane were married for 16 years. Mrs McFarlane gave up her career as a city solicitor
to look after their home and children whilst her husband continued to focus on market work. Whilst
they had agreed to divide their assets equally, there was disagreement over the level and duration of
periodical payments. The House of Lords ruled that Mrs McFarlane was entitled to an ongoing payment
of £250,000 per annum as compensation for her sacrifice during the marriage (Probert 2007).
So, Miller, McFarlane established a principle of compensation and suggested a possible application
to human capital. Consider the model with combined human capital as the household asset. Miller,
McFarlane indicates a shift from title based to equal sharing division of this asset. So, the model predicts
that the legal change should encourage cooperative investments in human capital – specialisation within
marriage should be encouraged. This increases the value of marriage and so should lead to some couples
formalising their relationships. Offsetting this would be some couples no longer marrying due to the
man’s lower divorce payoff. The impact on the divorce rate would be as discussed for the White case.
Whilst these key House of Lords and Appeal Court judgements affect the framework in which divorce
property division decisions are taken, their wider use and development is not assured. The yardstick of
equal division introduced in White has strongly influenced divorce outcomes subsequently. However, the
principle of compensation introduced in Miller, McFarlane has not been developed and applied more
widely. This means that there is differing treatment of financial and human capital on divorce. Marriage
17[2006] UKHL 24.
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is more valuable to couples looking to make noncontractible cooperative investments in physical capital
than it is for couples wishing to make similar investments in human capital. Since human capital is often
the most valuable asset posessed by a couple there is potential to popularise marriage by fully developing
this principle of compensation. The additional differentiation between marriage and cohabitation could
provide strong incentives to marry.
However, this implication is unlikely satisfy those campaigning for a return to marriage and traditional
family values since this mechanism would work precisely because couples are able to separate unilaterally.
Under a consent divorce regime the change to equal sharing property division causes the value of marriage
for couples with some parameter values to fall – they no longer get married or make a cooperative
investment. The long term divorce rate could increase, so marriage becomes more popular but less
stable. Also, in the absence of substantial assets, it is likely to cause ongoing financial obligations
between separating couples.
6 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a model to explore the impact of divorce property division laws on couples’
decisions to marry, make cooperative investments, and divorce, in an environment where prenuptial
contracting is not possible.
My analysis shows that an equal sharing property division regime allows all efficient cooperative
investments to be made within marriage. This increases the value of marriage relative to cohabitation.
The effect is strongest in a unilateral divorce regime where previously couples were indifferent between
marriage and cohabitation. After the move to equal sharing property division, all couples who were
unable to make cooperative investments can now do so, creating a benefit to marriage. There will be
unambiguously more cooperative investments in a unilateral divorce regime after the change to equal
sharing property division.
Opposing this incentive to marry, some wealthy individuals will become unwilling to marry due
to the risk to their personal contributions to household assets. Overall, the impact on the marriage
rate is ambiguous. However, the marriage rate is more likely to increase in a unilateral divorce regime
(with most Western jurisdictions having moved to such a regime) and where couples have more similar
characteristics (with a steady increase in positive assortative matching observed (Kalmijn 1991)).
My analysis also shows that the class of assets subject to the divorce property division regime matters.
If the regime is limited to physical and financial capital, then couples who can potentially gain from
specialisation (traditionally an important benefit of forming a household) will not be able to do so.
Extending coverage to include human capital would align incentives and so increase the value of marriage
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to such couples.
This paper highlights the fact that changes in these property division laws made in good faith to
address fairness concerns for those divorcing can have wider consequences on decisions to divorce, to
marry, and so to make cooperative investments. It is important that such effects are considered by
lawmakers when contemplating reform of marital property laws.
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